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Background to final offer arbitration Final offer arbitration (FOA) first received general attention in academic circles after an influential paper by Stevens (I 966) . Among the flurry of papers gen~rated by Steve~s' work, one claimed that FOA was first used by a Toronto hydro engineer Val Scott 1n 1964. However the clairn that FOA is of recent origin has been disputed by Treble (1986) who pointed out that FOA was used intermittently by conciliation ~ru:ds in s~veral British industries from 1860 on. Treble states that the concept ong1nated 1n the Nottingham hosiery industry in 1860, but although FOA was available it was never actually used and it was later introduced, and used, in the coalmining industry. . Treble ( 1986) noted:
The most striking facts about the experience of lhe boards are that final offer arbitration did not last long in most coalfields and that opposition to it came. , not from the negotiators, but from the arbitrators. (p.92).
Collective bargaining, conciliation, arbitration (conventional style) and FOA are all dispute settling processes. They can be employed to settle interest disputes (over the establishment of agreen1ents), rights disputes (over the interpretation or application of agreements) or personal grievances. The focus of this paper is primarily on interest disputes.
It is generally conceded that for collective bargaining not to be a sham, unions must have the right to strike or otherwise they will always operate from a position of weakness. Hence, if the freedom to strike is curtailed or withdrawn, access to arbitration is provided as compensation. Thus in New Zealand's private sector, since strikes over rights disputes are illegal, arbitration from the Labour Court is provided . . Under the Labour Relations Act 1987, strikes over interest disputes are now legal (with provisos), so arbitration is not a guaranteed option, although available if both parties agree.
The objective of conventional arbitration is lO provide an acceptable and workable solution. The role of the arbitrator is to consider the cases put by both sides and then to use "arbitral discretion" to reach a decision and make an award. It is clearly possible that the arbitrator may decide totally in favour of one party, but usually there is a compromise between the two positions, not only to make the settlement more acceptable to both sides but also to satisfy the arbitrator's concept of justice.
FOA is a variant of conventional arbitration which requires the arbitrator to choose one or other of the two parties' final offers. The arbitrator is not allowed to compromise, and cannot be concerned with acceptability and workability, but instead must accept the union's or employer's . final offer. Hence, taken sirnply as a method of arbitration (as opposed to a method of dispute settle1nent), FOA is clearly inferior to conventional arbitration. The latter can operate as FOA when the situation warrants, or can make compromises when that appears more suitable. As already quoted, Treble (1986) pointed out that in the nineteenth century, opposition to the use of FOA came from the arbitrators. Weitzman and Stochaj (1980, p.33) analyse the views of eighteen arbitrators involved in both conventional arbitration and FOA and discovered that ''two-thirds of the interviewees stated that they VlOuld prefer conventional arbitration over final-offer arbitration, because the former gives the neutral more discretion and the ability to compromise differences."
However FOA was not designed as a method of arbitration so much as a method of dispute settlement, with objectives differing from conventional arbitration. Unlike conventional arbitration, the objective of FOA is not to achieve an acceptable and workable solution. Final offer , arbitration , 89 Instead the objective of its original proponents was to make the cost of failing to reach a negotiated settlement so high that both parties would be forced .. by fear .. to negotiate and reach a seulemẽnt. Scott, the hydro-engineer mentioned earlier, is of the view that "arbitration of any kind is only an alternative to strikes and lockouts and not a substitute for negotiations. Hencẽ there is no reason to make arbitration just or pleasant" (Perigoe, 1973, p. 31) . ' Thus, Scott developed FOA which he never intended to be a means of producing a just or pleasant solution but rather, to use the colourful language of its proponents, , he intended it to be "the hydrogen bomb poised above the bargaining table whose very terror should ensure its non-use" (Holden,1976, p. 28) . The ~~non-use" is brought about (in theory) by the fact that the losing party will have gained nothing from the arbitration process and will have to accept the other party's final offer (or demand}. It is this high cost of being forced to accept what could be a demand so great that it is economically crippling, or an offer so low that it would mean loss of office for the union negotiators that is intended to deter the parties from resorting to FOA and force them to negotiate a settlement In general, interest disputes are not over a single issue but over a number of issues. Hence there are a number of obvious variations of FOA. Under the basic variant, the arbitrator selects what he or she believes to be the more reasonablẽ of the union's or management's final package. These could involve, for examplẽ, staffing levels, working conditions, the payment system, the level of the basic pay rate and holidays. The arbitrator has to judg, e on an overall basis which package is the most reasonable. This clearly could result in some issues being decided in favour of a party which, on those particular issues, was less reasonable. An alternative variant is that the arbitrator should consider each issue in turn and select the most reasonable final offer for each issue separately. There is thus compromise over the package as a whole but not for any single issue. One observer claims that the case for FOA :
is clearer in the single issue dispute than in the multiple i~sue dispute. In the latter, which is the usual case, difficulties of calculating the rate of exchange and trade-off among the various disputes increase the likelihood that the Board's decision will not be an optimal one (Rogow y 1973, p.28). This observation overlooks the fundamental purpose of FOA which is to increase the po~ential costs of failing to negotiate a settlement, not to produce an optimal decision. Thus if one accepts the rationale behind FOA, one is logically compelled to pre~er total package arbitration to issue by issue arbitration, since there is n1ore uncertainty and the potential costs of not settling are even greater.
The FOA offered under the State Sector Bill (2) ( and in the final act -Editor ) is ''in ' total", with s.8 of Schedule 1 B stipulating that the Arbitration Commission "must accept in full the final offer made by one of the parties"' and further that it "may not adopt only a part or parts of one final offer and a part or parts of the other final offer".
Evaluation of final offer arbitration
This paper will give an evaluation of FOA, considering in turn: a) the theoretical justification for FOA according to its proponents; b) how FOA works according to laboratory simulations; c) how FOA should work according to mathematical models and d)
.
how FOA appears to work in practice. There will be a concluding discussion with regard to FOA and the State Sector Act.
The author has previously expressed the view that "the basic logic underp. inning the concept of FOA is weak" (Geare, 1978, p.385) and nothing that has occurred in the intervening decade has altered that opinion. The theo~etical justification for FOA seems to rest on t~ee inter-dependent premises:
Premise 1 : That conventional arbitration is inferior to collective bargaining as a method of dispute settlement.
Premise 2 : That dispute settlement processes should encourage collective bargaining.
Premise 3 : That conventional arbitration has a "narcotic effect" (Feuille, I975, p.304) on the parties causing then1 to become "arbitration addicts" while FOA discourages its use and encourages collective bargaining.
Premise 1 seems to be regarded by some writers as a universal truth which needs no defence or justification. Thus, Northrup states that "free collective bargaining is the best solution we have been able to devise to the employer-employee relations" ' (1966,pp.182-3) . However, this assertion is in fact unproven. This does not mean that the premise is in fact false, but does support the view expressed by Hancock a quarter of a century ago that there were "no reasons which are neither trivial nor double-edged advanced by ... (supporters of either side) ... which warrant any firan preference for arbitration or collective bargaining". (Hancock,1962, p.20) In lhe earlier paper already quoted, this writer has asserted that the perceived superiority of collective bargaining over arbitration is based on a number of myths -that bargaining necessarily involves a "meeting of minds", that the process of bargaining is necessarily to narrow differences while that of arbitration is to broaden difCerences, that bargaining produces more cominitrncnt and finally that arbitration involves a multitude of lawyers. That earlier paper argued that these myths do not have univẽ.rsal va'lidity and indeed that the evidence frorn the New Zealand private sector shows that in the New Zealand context the myths are indeed false.
As Farber (1981) that "a statutory requirement that labor disputes be submitted to arbitration has a narcotic effect on private bargainers ... they will tum to it as an easy and habit forming release from the ... obligation of hard responsible bargaining" (Wheeler, 1977, p.ll7 ). This rnetaphor appealed to Arncrican writers (such as Feuille) \Vho incorporated it into their writings referring to arbitration addicts. Since the first premise is unproven, then whether or not arbitration produces "arbitration addicts" could be a non-issue. Indeed, if arbitration is actualJy a superior process to bargaining, the addiction would be a blessing not a bane. However, again as argued earlier by this writer, New Zealand experience in the priva~e sector has shown that the availability of arbitration does not necessarily result in the parties always resorting to it. Certainly the negotiations which prẽcede possible arbitration will clearly be influenced by the likely arbitration award, but the strictly limited use 1nade over the years of the Court of Arbitration and Arbitration Court shows that the premise is not true in New Zealand's ẽxperience.
It has already been pointed out that as FOA provides a more limited scope for arbittation than conventional arbitrnlion, it is clearly inferior if judged as a type of arbitration . In any dispute, if the "best" (ho\vever detern1ined) award is one or other final offer, then that can be achieved by conventional arbitration as well as FOA. However, if the "best" award is a comprornise, FOA cannot achieve it. For FOA to be other than an unpleasant joke, it must achieve what its proponents claim -both parties being scared into negotiation which results in either a settlement or little difference in the final positions.
There are difficulties with accepting evidence both from actual experience and fron1 laboratory simulations and mathematical modelling. Notz and Starke (1978) point out that field evidence gives contradictory results:
partially due to the studies being either cross-sectional or case, and the resu~ts raise many questions about their internal validity so that there are many alternative and plausible explanations for the relationships observed (p.190).
They go on to po!nt out that "those issues of internal validit~ can be dealt ~ith in. the laboratory". However laboratory sirn ulations and nlathematJcal models ra1se ser1ou~ questions as to the extent to which these results can be extended to ap~!Y to ac.tual industrial relations situations. As Bazerman and Farber (1982, p.88) observe cone) us1ons dra'"'n from data based on sin1ulations are not always generalizable to actual cases.'' Given these caveats this paper will now examine such evidence as exists upon v/hich to evaluate FOA.
Laboratory simulations
There have been a number of laboratory simulations where subjects, usually students but son1etimes practising arbitrators, role play dispute situations. In general, they were expected to negotiate a settlement with the possibility of conventional arbitration or FÕA if a seulemen t could not be reached. Some studies tried to comparẽ conventional arbitration with FOA, while others were examining the process of FOA.
Cornparative studies produced conflicting results. Two studies (Notz and Starke,1978, Starke and Notz,1981) A study (Farber and Bazerman, 1986 ) using actual arbitrators (there are sufficient numbers in the United States to be able to experiment with thern), discovered that the decision process by \vhich arbitrators make conventional awards or FOA awards is the same. With knowledge of the arbitrators' ideal conventional award, the researchers could accurately predict the FOA award in just under 90 percent of the cases. This fact however is disturbing. It means that in 10 percent of cases, the arbitrators 1nade illogical awards (based on their own values). This is indeed a prime argun1ent against FOA. If the parties do not converge, then one or other extreme offer has to be chosen. Evidence suggests that in such a case the "least ridiculous" offer may not. always be picked.
Mathematical n1odels
During the 1980s a nun1ber of studies appeared \vhich assessed FOA according to rnathematical models, usualJy ernploying utility theory and garne theory. Those tested whether convergence of offers can be predicted and whether Nash optimal solutions (Nash 1950 and 1953) arise. These studies have littJe face validity to non-mathematicians, and one suspects that the general attitude to such studies is to accept them if they support one's preconceived ideas and dis1niss them as obvious rubbish if they do not Practitioners who are non-mathematicians will be interested to read such confident and definite
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This writer would be much happier to fead '*the behaviour of the parties can be explained to some extent by the following expected utilities ... "
As with laboratory studies, the results from the mathematical modelling are not definite, but tend to be unsupportive of FOA. Brams and M' errill (1983) consider their model demonstrates that in a situation of uncertainty (as Lo the arbitrator's considered optimum solution) FOA produces divergence not convergence. Farber (1980) FOA has predominantly been used in the public sector in the U.S., and also in setting salaries for professional baseball players. In most situations strikes are illegal {and the bans are ẽffective) so the "acceptability'' of the FOA decisions are hard to evaluate. Certainly some v. 1 riters are enthusiastic about FOA, while others are not.
The results of FOA are difficult to evaluate. Ashenfelter and Blooin (1983) warn that "it takes careCul analysis before box scores or win-loss records are of any value in detern1ining the integrity or fairness of an arbitration system" (p.539). In their two papers, they analyse results in . New Jersey, a state where a "remarkable statute provides for conv· entional arbitration of pay disputes if the t\VO parties can agree to this, but requires the use of final-offer arbitration if they cannot (1984, p.lll). They point out that while unions win at F· OA two-thirds of the time, the increases Lhey get from FOA are lower than under conventional arbitration. They win at FOA because they are less ambitious than the employers, but they in fact do better under conventional arbitration (1983, pp.538-9).
Chelius and Dworkin (1980, p.305) consider that FOA operates well and "'appears to encourage bilateral collective bargaining and redistribute power in much the same manner as would the right to strike." On the other hand Robitzek (1979) The Labour Government has made it clear that jt wants unions to negotiate settlements rather than use arbitration. It has given unions the right to strike (within 60 days of the expiry of the award or agreement) and hence feels under no obligation to provide arbitration. This latest move ro offer FOA can be considered part of an overall strategy, rather than evidence that the Government sees particular merit in FOA.
The unions have only lhree months to ensure they get a compulsory arbitration clause, as the legislation requires that the unions decide whether to request the clause by 30 June 1988. After that the State Services Commission is not obliged to agree to it. By putting in the time constraint, the Government is suggesting that F, OA is an advantage to the unions. They win clearly be diverted from their straight out opposition to the State Sector Act. Furthermore, if the unions reject the offer on the basis that they have to agree to a two-year no strike agreement, they are made to look shallow and insincere in their claims that they object to the State Sector Act because it obliges them to go on strike. If unions object to FOA because it has theoretical weaknesses, they will be told that if they are reasonable, they have nothing to fear. The problem of course is that in some disputes both sides takẽ widely differing views and both sides feel they are right and reasonable.
To conclude, this writer does not consider that FOA will necessarily cause chaos, but does believe the possibility exists of an extreme award having to be made. THe resulting problems could be severe. At this stage, it is also possible that no union will opt for FOA and it becomes a total non-event or that unions or the Government happily accept FOA awards. 
